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Ideational	and	Material	Forces	in	Threat	Perception	
The	Divergent	Cases	of	Syria	and	Saudi	Arabia	during	the	Iran‐Iraq	War	(1980‐1988)1	
	
	
Abstract	
How	do	states	perceive	 threats?	Why	are	material	 forces	sometimes	more	prominent	 in	shaping	threat	
perception,	 whereas	 ideational	 ones	 are	 the	 motivator	 in	 other	 instances?	 This	 article	 aims	 to	 move	
beyond	the	task	of	determining	whether	material	or	ideational	factors	offer	a	more	plausible	explanation	
to	 specify	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 one	 of	 these	 two	 factors	 become	 salient	 in	 regimes’	 threat	
perception.	 Based	on	 ‘analytical	 eclecticism’,	 this	 article	 proposes	 an	 integrated	 framework	of	 analysis	
combining	ideational	and	material	forces	and	delineating	the	conditions	of	their	interaction.	When	regime	
identity	is	fixed	and	the	material	structure	provided	multiple	strategic	options	to	ensure	state’s	physical	
security,	 leaders	 perceive	 challenges	 to	 their	 identity	 as	 more	 salient.	 When	 their	 identity	 is	 fluid	
providing	multiple	 narratives	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	military	 capabilities	 only	 allows	 limited	 strategic	
options	for	physical	security,	leaders	perceive	threats	to	their	physical	security	as	more	prominent.	As	a	
result,	 the	 regime’s	 identity	 narrative	 undergoes	 reframing	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 constraints	 of	 the	material	
structure.	 To	 examine	 the	 validity	 of	 this	 argument,	 I	 analyse	 the	 divergent	 Syrian	 and	 Saudi	 threat	
perceptions	during	the	Iran‐Iraq	War	(1980‐1988).	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																													
1	I	am	grateful	to	Adham	Saouli,	Juliet	Kaarbo,	Lawrence	Rubin,	Theodore	McLauchlin,	and	David	Blagden	
for	their	insightful	comments	on	earlier	drafts.	I	also	would	like	to	thank	three	anonymous	reviewers	and	
the	 editors	 for	 their	 invaluable	 comments.	 Earlier	 drafts	 were	 presented	 at	 the	 International	 Studies	
Association	Annual	 Conference	 (March	2014)	 and	 the	Annual	Conference	 of	 the	Project	 of	Middle	East	
Political	Science—POMEPS	(May	2015).	
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INTRODUCTION	
The	 Iranian	 revolution	 (1979)	 stands	 as	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	 events	 of	modern	Middle	
East	 history;	 it	 brought	 normative	 and	 structural	 changes	 in	 the	 region.	 Following	 the	
revolution,	 Iran’s	 military	 capabilities	 significantly	 declined	 whereas	 Iraq’s	 military	 power	
nearly	 doubled	 reflecting	 Saddam	 Hussein’s	 regional	 ambitions.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 Islamic	
revolution	attempted	 to	export	 its	message	across	 the	region,	which	constituted	an	 ideational	
challenge	 to	 its	 neighbours.	With	 the	outbreak	 of	 the	 Iran‐Iraq	war	 (1980‐1988),	Arab	 states	
made	different	alliance	choices	based	on	divergent	perceptions	of	these	ideational	and	material	
threats.	Whereas	Syria	perceived	Iraq	as	an	emerging	military	threat	and	allied	with	Iran,	Saudi	
Arabia	perceived	Iran’s	new	identity	narrative	as	more	threatening	and	allied	with	Iraq.	These	
diametrically	opposite	decisions	are	one	of	the	most	intriguing	puzzles	in	Middle	East	politics.	
Whereas	traditional	realist	explanations	can	account	for	Syria’s	threat	perception,	they	fall	short	
of	 explaining	 the	 Saudi	 decision.	 Although	 both	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 Syria	 share	 geographic	
proximity	with	Iraq,	the	Saudis	did	not	perceive	Iraq	as	a	threat.	Many	conventional	ideational	
explanations	examine	Saudi	threat	perception	through	the	fear	of	the	diffusion	of	revolutionary	
ideas	emanating	 from	Iran.	This	explanation	does	not,	however,	explain	why	Syria—a	secular	
Ba’athist	 regime	 oppressing	 Islamic	movements—did	 not	 fear	 Iran’s	 revolutionary	 narrative.	
This	 article	 examines	 the	 following	 research	 question:	 why	 do	 states	 sometimes	 consider	
ideational	threats	as	more	prominent	whereas	material	considerations	seem	to	dominate	their	
threat	perception	in	other	instances?		
Although	 threat	 perception	 has	 been	 a	 cornerstone	 in	 the	 study	 of	 alliances	 in	 the	
Middle	East,	the	empirical	puzzle	of	Syrian	and	Saudi	threat	perceptions	unravels	some	gaps	in	
the	 existing	 literature.	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 identity	 shapes	 a	 regime’s	 threat	 perception	 in	
systematic	ways,	and	materialist	considerations,	such	as	distribution	of	military	capabilities,	are	
also	 fundamental.	 My	 aim,	 therefore,	 is	 not	 to	 show	 that	 ideational	 factors	 override	 other	
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material	factors	or	vice	versa.	Instead,	this	article	examines	the	conditions	under	which	material	
forces	are	prominent	in	shaping	threat	perception	and	those	under	which	ideational	forces	are	
more	salient.	
Based	on	analytical	eclecticism,	this	article	examines	the	role	of	ideational	and	material	
forces	 as	 sources	 of	 threat	 perception.	 It	 differs	 from	 the	 previous	 literature	 in	 its	
characterization	 of	 threat.	 Whereas	 previous	 work2	has	 dealt	 with	 threat	 perception	 as	 a	
discreet	 event	 that	 precedes	 alliance	 decisions,	 this	 article	 shows	 that	 it	 is	 a	 process	 of	
interaction	 between	 states’	 material	 capabilities	 and	 identity	 narratives.	 The	 heavy	 focus	 of	
international	 relations	 scholars	 on	 alliance	 formation	 as	 the	 major	 defence	 mechanism	
following	threat	perception	overlooks	this	process,	especially	if	an	alliance	is	already	in	place.	It	
also	obscures	other	types	of	 foreign	policy	behaviour	such	as	 ideational	balancing	and	regime	
identity	 reframing	 (e.g.	 Rubin,	 2014).	 Therefore,	 this	 study	 looks	 at	 threat	 perception	 as	 a	
process	 that	 leads	 to	 various	 foreign	 policy	 behaviour,	 such	 as	 identity	 reframing,	 resource	
mobilization,	and	alliance	 formation	or	consolidation.	Accordingly,	 the	aim	of	 this	article	 is	 to	
examine	how	ideational	and	material	forces	interplay	in	states’	threat	perception	at	the	regional	
level	in	the	Middle	East.	The	endeavour	is	to	examine	the	specific	aspects	of	threat	perception	in	
the	historical	cases	of	Syria	and	Saudi	Arabia	during	the	Iran‐Iraq	War.	
	I	argue	that	states	can	fear	for	their	physical	security	but	also	for	their	identity.	States	
can	 face	 unfavourable	 distribution	 of	military	 capabilities,	which	 can	 endanger	 their	 physical	
security.	Meanwhile	states	can	find	their	identity	challenged	by	other	identity	narratives	in	the	
region,	which	 can	 threaten	 their	 domestic	 stability.	 Sometimes,	 states	 can	perceive	 threats	 to	
their	 identity	 as	more	prominent	whereas	material	 forces	dominate	 their	perception	 in	other	
instances.	To	explain	this	variation,	this	article	presents	a	two‐layered	framework.	I	argue	that	
when	the	distribution	of	military	capabilities	presents	several	strategic	policy	options	ensuring	
physical	 security	whereas	 identity	 is	 fixed,	 leaders	 perceive	 threats	 to	 their	 identity	 as	more	
																																																													
2	Cf.	Goodarzi	(2006)	and	Ryan	(2009).	
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salient.	 Accordingly,	 regimes	 aim	 to	 reinforce	 their	 self‐identity	 and,	 therefore,	 frame	 their	
preferred	course	of	action	in	those	identity	terms.	I	claim	that	this	was	the	case	of	Saudi	Arabia	
during	the	Iran‐Iraq	War	(1980‐1988).	Material	forces,	on	the	other	hand,	are	likely	to	dominate	
threat	perception	when	identities	are	fluid	and	several	identities	co‐exist	and,	in	the	meantime,	
the	 regimes	 face	 a	 distribution	 of	 military	 capabilities	 with	 limited	 policy	 options	 ensuring	
physical	 security.	 In	 this	 situation,	 leaders	perceive	 threats	 to	 their	physical	 security	 as	more	
prominent.	 Henceforth,	 the	 regime	 identity	 undergoes	 a	 process	 of	 adaptation	 to	 conform	 to	
material	 security	 needs.	 More	 specifically,	 the	 material	 interest	 is	 likely	 to	 determine	 which	
identity	narrative	is	selected.	I	claim	that	Syria’s	case	demonstrates	this	pathway.		
The	article	is	structured	as	follows.	I,	first,	discuss	conventional	explanations	for	threat	
perception	 in	 Middle	 Eastern	 international	 relations.	 Second,	 I	 present	 the	 conceptual	
framework	clarifying	how	ideational	and	material	 factors	can	be	threatening.	 I	 then	develop	a	
theoretical	 argument	 on	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 ideational	 or	 material	 forces	 dominate	
threat	perception.	Afterwards,	the	empirical	part	of	the	article	analyzes	the	divergent	Saudi	and	
Syrian	threat	perceptions	during	the	Iran	Iraq	War	(1980‐1988).		
	
THEORIZING	THREAT	PERCEPTION	
THE	REDUCTIONISM	OF	NEOREALISM	AND	CONSTRUCTIVISM	
How	do	states	perceive	threats?	How	do	ideational	and	material	forces	affect	states’	perception	
of	threats?	Threat	perception	is	often	defined	as	an	actor’s	perception	of	anticipated	harm	based	
on	 combination	 of	 perceived	 intentions	 and	 capabilities	 (Singer	 1958;	 Knorr	 1976;	 Cohen	
1978).	The	question	of	how	states	assess	threats	is	subject	to	debate	between	those	favouring	
material	factors	and	those	supporting	ideational	ones.	Whereas	realism	posits	that	capability	is	
the	most	important,	constructivists	emphasize	that	identities	and	ideas	matter	more.	
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According	 to	 realism,	 structural	 factors—such	 as	 shifts	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	military	
capabilities—create	 external	 military	 threats.	 For	 both	 classical	 (e.g.	 Morgenthau	 1948)	 and	
structural	 realists	 (e.g.	Waltz	1979),	 asymmetries	 of	 power	 are	 the	most	 important	 source	of	
threat	 perception.	 This	 approach	 considers	 ideational	 factors—state	 identity,	 ideology,	 and	
intentions—to	 be	 secondary	 or	 even	 reductionist.	 Stephan	 Walt’s	 The	 Origins	 of	 Alliance	
presents	a	refinement	of	neorealism’s	heavy	reliance	on	material	factors.	He	argues	that	threat	
is	 a	 function	 of	 aggregate	 power,	 geographic	 proximity,	 offensive	 capabilities,	 and	 aggressive	
intentions.	 Although	 Walt	 adds	 ‘aggressive	 intentions’	 as	 a	 source	 of	 threats,	 this	 ideational	
perspective	 remained	 untheorized.	 As	 Goldgeier	 (1997,	 141)	 points	 out,	Walt	 ‘argues	 for	 the	
importance	of	perceptions,	beliefs,	motivation,	and	bias	while	leaving	the	origins	of	these	factors	
to	case‐by‐case	empirical	study	rather	than	systematic	theoretical	investigation’.		
	 	The	 constructivist	 approach	 in	 IR	 examines	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 threat	 perception	
differently.3	Threats	 are	not	objective,	materially	 based	 facts;	 threats	 are	 social	 constructions.	
Identities	and	ideas	play	a	crucial	role	in	creating	social	facts;	identities	and	material	interests	
are	 co‐constituted.	 For	 example,	Barnett	 (1996,	 1998)	 argues	 that	 identity	provides	 a	 ‘better’	
conceptual	 lens	 to	 threat	 perception	 than	material	 factors.	 By	 examining	 Arab	 politics	 in	 the	
1950s	 and	 1960s,	 Barnett	 argues	 that	 Arab	 regimes	 are	 threatened	 when	 a	 competing	
transnational	narrative	of	pan‐Arabism	challenges	their	legitimacy	and	sovereignty.	For	Barnett,	
identities	and	norms	are	 in	constant	change	through	 interaction	with	others,	which	 led	to	 the	
demise	of	pan‐Arabism.	In	the	same	vein,	Owen	(2010)	argues	that	competing	ideologies	at	the	
international	 level	can	threaten	states,	as	 it	challenges	their	stability	and	legitimacy.	Similarly,	
Gause	 (2003)	 offers	 an	 important	 corrective	 attempt	 of	 both	 neorealist	 and	 constructivist	
accounts	of	 threat	perception.	He	 shows	 that	 regimes	balance	against	 the	greatest	 ideological	
threat.	Rubin	(2014)	argues	that	symbolic	ideas	can	be	threatening	as	they	can	cause	domestic	
instability	and	endanger	regimes’	security.	
																																																													
3	Constructivism,	 here,	 refers	 to	 ‘thin’	 constructivism	 in	 IR,	 according	 to	which	 social	 reality	 exists	 out	
there	and	can	be	accessed	through	empirical	research	(Wendt	1999).		
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As	 neorealism	 treats	 ideational	 factors	 as	 epiphenomenon,	 constructivism	 considers	
material	 forces	 to	 be	 secondary	 (Hinnebusch	 2003,	 362).	 By	 treating	 material	 forces	 as	
dependent	 on	 ideational	 factors,	 constructivism	 could	 not	 account	 for	 cases	 where	 threat	
perceptions	were	driven	by	material	 forces.	As	Barnett	 shows	 that	Arab	 leaders	 violated	 ‘the	
norms	of	Arabism’	on	many	occasions.	By	considering	material	forces	to	be	secondary,	Barnett	
could	not	uncover	when	leaders	choose	to	violate	their	identity	narrative.	Relevant	to	the	case	
studies	 of	 this	 article,	 constructivism	 accounts	 for	 Saudi	 perception	 of	 Iran	 as	 an	 ideational	
threat.	 The	 Islamic	 revolution	 presented	 a	 competing	 narrative	 of	 pan‐Islamism	 that	
undermined	 the	 Kingdom’s	 identity	 narrative.	 Although	 the	 Islamic	 revolution	 constituted	 a	
similar	challenge	to	Syria,	the	same	argument	fails	to	account	for	al‐Assad’s	decision	to	ally	with	
Iran.	In	short,	some	ideas	and	identities	seem	to	threaten	some	states	but	not	others.	
The	Syrian	decision	to	ally	with	Iran	challenges	ideational	explanations.	As	Gause	(2003,	
298)	notes,	‘The	[Ba’athist]	regime	in	Damascus	and	the	Islamic	revolutionaries	in	Teheran	had	
very	 little	 in	 common.	 [Ayatollah	 Khomeini]	 excoriated	 secular	 and	 nationalist	 regimes	 that	
suppressed	local	Islamic	movements;	the	[Assad]	regime	was	a	prototype	of	such	a	regime’.	In	
an	attempt	to	solve	this	anomaly,	Haas	(2012,	xv)	argues	that	threat	perception	is	a	function	of	
what	he	calls	‘ideological	distance’—that	is	‘the	degree	of	ideological	differences	dividing	states’	
leaders’.	He	 claims	 that	 the	more	 ideologically	different,	 the	more	 states	become	 threatening.	
Although	 he	 acknowledges	 the	 ideological	 schism	 between	 Syria	 and	 Iran,	 he	 argues	 that	
ideological	multipolarity	can	temper	the	effect	of	ideological	differences.	Accordingly,	a	common	
ideological	 enemy—Zionism—created	 incentives	 for	 cooperation	 between	 these	 two	 states.	
This	argument	 fails,	however,	 to	account	 for	the	animosity	between	the	two	Ba’athist	regimes	
despite	 their	 ideological	 similarity	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 common	 ideological	 enemies,	 namely	
Zionism	 and	 the	 Islamic	 revolution.	 In	 sum,	 the	 existing	 literature	 remains	 either	 focused	 on	
ideational	 or	 material	 factors	 and,	 therefore,	 fails	 to	 specify	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	
ideational	or	material	factors	predominate	in	regimes’	threat	perception.	
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COMBINING	IDEATIONAL	AND	MATERIAL	FORCES	
AN	INTEGRATED	FRAMEWORK	OF	ANALYSIS	
The	 following	 conceptual	 framework	 examines	 three	 theoretical	 issues.	 I,	 first,	 present	
‘analytical	 eclecticism’	 as	 the	 overarching	 approach	 of	 this	 study.	 I,	 then,	 present	 a	 rigorous	
definition	 of	 material	 and	 ideational	 forces	 as	 well	 as	 their	 respective	 effect	 on	 threat	
perception.	 Afterwards,	 I	 present	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 ideational	 or	 material	 forces	
dominate	threat	perception.	
Before	proceeding	 to	 the	main	argument	of	 this	 study,	 I	need	 to	answer	an	 important	
question:	who	perceives	 and	 assesses	 the	 threat?	This	 study	 focuses	 on	 threats	 perceived	 by	
regimes	 in	 the	Middle	 East.	 The	 literature	 on	 democratic	 transition	 has	made	 the	 distinction	
between	state	and	regime.	A	regime	can	be	defined	as	‘the	formal	and	informal	organization	of	
the	 centre	of	political	power,	 and	 its	 relations	with	 the	broader	 society.	A	 regime	determines	
who	has	access	to	political	power,	and	how	those	who	in	power	deal	with	who	are	not’	(Fishman	
1990,	 428).	 The	 state,	 however,	 is	 the	 most	 permanent	 structure	 of	 political	 domination,	
including	coercive	capacities	and	abilities	to	control	society.	Although	the	distinction	has	been	
useful	in	examining	cases	in	southern	Europe	and	Latin	American,	the	cases	of	the	Middle	East	
present	 a	 challenge	 to	 this	 distinction.	 The	 history	 of	 state	 formation	 in	 the	 Middle	 East	 is	
inextricably	 intertwined	 with	 regime	 power	 (Ayubi	 1996;	 R.	 Owen	 2004).	 As	 Longva	 (2000,	
193)	puts	it,	a	Saudi	notion	of	belonging	‘to	a	land	or	an	“imagined	community”	is	unthinkable	
because	 the	 country	 itself	 is	 appropriated	 to	 the	 ruling	 family	whose	name	 it	 bears’.	 In	other	
words,	 state	apparatuses	 in	 the	Middle	East	have	been	co‐opted,	penetrated,	and	captured	by	
authoritarian	regimes	(Anderson	1987,	7).	Therefore,	I	provisionally	use	‘state’	and	‘regime’	in	
the	Middle	 East	 interchangeably	 to	 signify	 the	 threat	 perception	 of	 the	 elite	 in	 power,	which	
becomes	diffused	and	transmitted	to	states’	apparatuses.	
1. Analytical	Eclecticism	
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The	 puzzle	 of	 how	 threat	 is	 perceived	 cannot	 be	 solved	 with	 either	 material	 or	 ideational	
explanations,	nor	can	it	be	addressed	from	within	either	domestic	or	regional	contexts.	Inspired	
by	Katzenstein	and	Sil	(2010,	10),	this	article	advocates	‘analytical	eclecticism',	which	is	defined	
as	‘any	approach	that	seeks	to	extricate,	translate,	and	selectively	integrate	analytic	elements—
concepts,	 logics,	 mechanisms,	 and	 interpretations—of	 theories	 or	 narratives	 that	 have	 been	
developed	within	separate	paradigms	but	that	address	related	aspects	of	substantive	problems	
that	have	both	scholarly	and	practical	significance’.		
Based	on	analytical	eclecticism,	some	IR	scholars	have	combined	ideational	and	material	
forces	 in	 their	 study	 of	 international	 and	 regional	 structures.	 Barkin	 (2010)	 claims	 that	
constructivist	research	is	compatible	with	realist	worldview,	and	both	should	not	be	considered	
as	 mutually	 exclusive.	 Based	 on	 his	 concept	 of	 ‘realist	 constructivism’,	 constructivism	 is	 a	
methodological	approach	 illuminating	 the	uses	of	power	and	 the	normative	aspects	of	power.		
Similarly,	 Sørensen	 (2008)	 presents	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 international	 structure	 and	 the	
modern	state‐system	based	on	combining	elements	from	neorealism	and	constructivism.	While	
Wendt	(1999,	110‐111)	increasingly	emphasizes	the	importance	of	ideas,	he	endorses	a	‘rump	
materialism’	 according	 to	 which	 material	 factors—such	 as	 material	 power	 distribution,	
geography,	 and	 technological	 capabilities—influence	 international	 structures.	 Most	 of	 these	
works	 have	 embraced	 a	 structural	 perspective,	 and	 the	 interplay	 of	 ideational	 and	 material	
forces	at	the	‘unit’	(i.e.	agent)	remains	overlooked.4	Against	this	backdrop,	this	article	examines	
how	 ideational	 and	material	 forces	 at	 international	 and	 domestic	 levels	 	 drive	 actors’	 threat	
perceptions	and	foreign	policy	choices.	
In	 this	 article,	 I	 develop	 a	 two‐layered	 framework	 of	 analysis	 where	 both	 elements	
operate	 following	 separate	 dynamics.	 I	 start	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 states	 pursue	 both	
identity	and	physical	security.	Regimes	hold	identity	narratives	relating	to	their	ideology,	state	
history,	 and	 culture,	 but	 they	 also	 hold	 a	 quest	 for	 survival	 at	 the	 regional	 level	 (physical	
																																																													
4	With	the	exception	of	few	studies,	cf.	Risse	et	al.	(1999)	and	Nau	(2002).	
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security).	 Although	 ideational	 and	material	 forces	 have	 separate	 dynamics,	 I	 argue	 that	 both	
interact,	and	the	arrows	of	 interaction	run	both	ways.	Under	certain	conditions,	 identities	can	
shape	how	regimes	perceive	material	 forces.	Under	other	conditions,	a	change	 in	 the	material	
factors	 in	 the	 structure	 can	 lead	 over	 time	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 regime	 identity.	 Whereas	
constructivists	consider	identities	and	interests	to	be	co‐constituted,	I	treat	identity	as	a	factor	
that	is	analytically	distinct	from	material	factors	(Kowert	and	Legro	1996).	Both	ideational	and	
material	forces	have	separate	dynamics	(Kitchen	2010).	Yet,	they	are	interacting.	In	some	cases,	
states	may	uphold	particular	identity	narratives	because	it	is	in	their	material	interest	to	do	so.	
States	 can	 also	 maintain	 identities	 that	 contradict	 their	 material	 interests,	 and	 it	 is	 for	 this	
reason	 that	 identities	 and	 material	 interests	 should	 remain	 conceptually	 and	 analytically	
distinct.	As	Hinnebusch	 (2003,	362)	 explains,	 ‘state	 interests	 and	 identity,	 are	autonomous	of	
each	other,	but	stability	depends	on	a	correspondence	between	them…	[T]hey	can	be	in	conflict,	
but	 where	 this	 is	 so,	 in	 time	 either	 norms	 and	 identity	 will	 likely	 stimulate	 revolts	 against	
material	 power	 structures	 perceived	 to	 be	 illegitimate	 or	 they	will	 be	 altered	 to	 conform	 to	
material	interests	and	constraints’.		
2. Ideational	and	Material	Forces	and	How	They	Affect	Threat	Perception	
A	 good	 starting	 point	 is	 to	 define	 ‘ideational’	 and	 ‘material’	 forces,	 as	 both	 terms	 inevitably	
evoke	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 images.	 ‘Material’	 factors	 are	 those	 related	 to	 ‘the	 capabilities	 or	
resources	mainly	military,	with	which	states	 influence	one	another’	(Wivel	2005,	368).	 In	this	
article,	I	focus	on	‘distribution	of	military	capabilities’	as	the	primary	material	factor	influencing	
threat	perception.	This	term	refers	to	the	real	distribution	of	capabilities,	to	which	states	adjust	
or	 fail	 to	 adapt.	 Although	 fundamental	 to	 generating	 fears	 and	 threats,	 the	 distribution	 of	
material	capabilities	alone	is	insufficient	to	measure	material	power.	For	this	reason,	I	draw	a	
connection	 between	 a	 state's	 military	 power	 and	 its	 capabilities	 based	 on	 the	 logic	 of	 the	
offence–defence	balance,	which	is	defined	as	 ‘a	state's	ability	to	perform	the	military	missions	
that	are	required	to	successfully	attack,	deter,	or	defend’	(Glaser	and	Kaufmann	1998,	48).	From	
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this	perspective,	something	is	perceived	as	a	material	threat	when	it	comes	from	a	state	that	not	
only	possesses	military	power,	measured	in	terms	of	relative	distribution,	but	that	also	has	the	
capability	 to	 project	 it.	 Scholars	 of	 political	 psychology	 pay	 careful	 attention	 to	 the	 variance	
between	what	 leaders	 perceive	 and	what	 the	 evidence	 of	military	 capabilities	 suggest	 (Jervis	
1976;	 Stein	 1988).	 They	 have	 even	 highlighted	 the	 difficulty	 of	 how	 objective	 and	 subjective	
factors	 can	 influence	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 (Wohlforth	 1993).	 From	 this	
perspective,	 the	 distribution	 of	 military	 capabilities	 and	 the	 offence‐defence	 balance	 are	
indicators	of	this	objective	aspect.	
	 The	 subjective	 dimension	 is	 inextricably	 related	 to	 ideational	 factors.	 These	 are	 more	
problematic	 in	 their	definition	than	material	ones.	 Ideational	 factors	 include	diverse	elements	
such	 as	 culture,	 norms,	 values,	 beliefs,	 identity,	 and	 ideology.	 My	 focus	 here	 is	 on	 ‘identity’.	
Drawing	 on	 Jepperson	 et	 al.	 (1996,	 59),	 identity	 refers	 to	 ‘the	 image	 of	 individuality	 and	
distinctiveness	 (selfhood)	 held	 and	 projected	 by	 an	 actor’.	 Accordingly,	 state	 identity	 is	 the	
result	 of	 two	 primary	 paths:	 current	 interactions	 between	 states	 and	 the	 characteristics	 that	
shape	states’	perception	of	the	Self.	Barnett	(1999,	9)	defines	identity	as	‘the	understanding	of	
oneself	 in	 relationship	 to	 others’.	 This	 relational	 perspective	 holds	 that	 a	 state’s	 identity	
acquires	meaning	via	its	distinctiveness	from	others.		
	 	 Identity	is	also	about	how	a	state	perceives	itself.	State	identity	is,	according	to	Wendt	
(1999,	 224),	 ‘rooted	 in	 the	 actor’s	 self‐understanding’.	 States	 might	 base	 their	 actions	 on	
religion,	as	in	Saudi	Arabia	or	Iran,	or	on	ideology,	like	in	the	pan‐Arab	regimes	in	Syria	or	Egypt	
under	Nasser.	This	self‐perception	mostly	relies	on	domestic	sources,	and	it	is	corroborated	by	
the	 common	 belief	 that	 makes	 domestic	 groups	 aggregate	 their	 views	 around	 a	 particular	
institution.	 The	 domestic	 sphere	 is	 a	 pool	 that	 provides	 policy‐makers	 with	 a	 ‘menu	 of	
identities’.	 Accordingly,	 the	 relational	 and	 domestic	 dimensions	 of	 state	 identity	 are	 not	
separable;	rather,	they	interact	with	and	shape	one	another.	As	the	analysis	focuses	on	regimes,	
the	conception	of	 ‘regime	identity’	used	here	is	different	from	‘national	identity’,	where	nation	
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and	 state	 overlap.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 study,	 I	 define	 ‘regime	 identity’	 as	 the	 identity	
espoused	by	the	dominant	elite	in	power.	This	regime	identity	does	not	necessarily	reflect	the	
identity	of	a	particular	group	in	the	society,	but	the	ruling	elite	provides	a	narrative	about	the	
state	and	its	distinctiveness	vis‐à‐vis	other	states	in	the	international	system.		
	 	 To	examine	how	identity	shapes	threat	perception,	I	build	on	the	assumption	that	states	
want	to	affirm	their	self‐identity	and	pursue	foreign	policies	that	highlight	their	distinctiveness	
from	others.	The	ideational	threat	is	the	danger	that	a	particular	set	of	ideas	held	and	projected	
by	the	Other	can	challenge	the	state’s	identity	narrative	at	the	external	and/or	domestic	levels.	
These	ideational	challenges	can	be	as	important	as	physical	threats.	Because	the	domestic	and	
external	spheres	are	interconnected,	such	challenges	can	pose	an	existential	threat	to	the	state,	
jeopardizing	 its	 narrative	 about	 the	 Self	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 Other.	 If	 statesmen	 fail	 to	 maintain	 a	
consistent	 narrative	 about	 the	 state’s	 identity	 and	 its	 raison	d’être,	 domestic	 rifts	 can	 ensue.	
From	this	perspective,	regime	identity	is	threatened	when	the	narrative	about	the	state	and	its	
distinctiveness	is	challenged.	This	challenge	can	lead	to	identity	insecurity,	what	some	scholars	
termed	 as	 ‘ontological	 insecurity’	 (Steele	 2005;	 Mitzen	 2006).	 Mitzen	 (2006,	 344)	 defines	
ontological	security	as	‘security	not	of	the	body	but	of	the	self,	the	subjective	sense	of	who	one	
is,	which	 enables	 and	motivates	 action	 and	 choice’	 Accordingly,	 an	 ontological	 insecurity	 can	
lead	 the	weakening	 of	 the	 regime	narrative	 at	 the	 domestic	 levels.	 If	 the	 regime	 is	 unable	 to	
formulate	a	narrative	of	state’s	raison	d’être,	societal	groups	might	be	easily	mobilized	against	
the	regime.		The	resulting	sense	of	insecurity	usually	leads	to	policies	that	affirm	and	reinforce	
the	state's	self‐assigned	identity,	or	in	other	words,	its	ontological	security.		
Regime	 identity	provides	 leaders	with	opportunities	and	constraints,	which	 influences	
their	 perception	 of	 threat.	 Students	 of	 nationalism	 and	 identity	 politics	 have	 observed	 that	
states	can	hold	multiples	identities	(Young	1979;	Laitin	1986;	Horowitz	1995).	This	fluidity	of	
identity	 provides	 leaders	 with	 the	 opportunity	 to	 ‘activate’	 and	 ‘deactivate’	 their	 identity	
narratives	 during	 certain	 social	 situations	 (Telhami	 and	 Barnett	 2002,	 13–15).	 For	 example,	
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Sadowski	 (2002,	 13–138)	 narrates	 how	 a	 Syrian	 officer	 can	 define	 himself	 in	multiple	ways:	
Arab,	Ba’thi,	Sunni/non‐Sunni,	member	of	a	particular	sect,	and/or	member	of	a	tribe	or	family.	
Karwan	(2002,	156)	argues	 that	Egyptian	 foreign	policy	 invoked	various	 identities	over	 time:	
Arab,	Islamic,	Middle	Eastern,	African,	and	Mediterranean.	This	highlights	the	intrinsic	character	
of	identity	that	is	fluid.	Identity	scholars	in	social	psychology	invariably	emphasize	the	existence	
of	multiple	concepts	of	identity	within	an	actor	(Parsons	1968,	14–15;	Turner	1968,	100–102).	
In	other	words,	a	particular	context	renders	one	particular	identity	more	significant	than	other	
identities	that	simultaneously	exist	within	a	single	actor.	 If	regime’s	self	 identity	is	threatened	
upon	 the	emergence	of	a	competing	narrative	at	 the	structural	 level,	 leaders	can	reframe	and	
invoke	other	images	of	their	identities	to	preserve	their	stability	and	legitimacy.	Nevertheless,	
identity	 can	 be	 also	 a	 constraint	 on	 state	 behaviour	 when	 it	 is	 fixed	 and	 incapable	 of	 being	
melded.	 Saudi	Arabia	 presents	 an	 example	 of	 this	 constraint,	 the	 Saudi	 state	 identity	 became	
inextricably	 related	 to	 Wahhabi	 interpretation	 of	 Islam	 (Nevo	 1998).	 In	 this	 case,	 identity	
threats	become	acute.	As	Abdelal	et	al.	(2006)	note,	measuring	the	fluidity	of	identity	remains	a	
challenging	task,	and	it	remains	an	empirical	question.	Therefore,	 I	rely	on	discourse	analysis,	
looking	at	speeches	and	statement,	focusing	on	the	language	that	leaders	use	to	describe	their	
identity	 narrative.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 study,	 I	 consider	 an	 identity	 to	 be	 fixed	 if	 a	 single	
identity	 is	 dominant	 and	 leaders	 cannot	 invoke	 other	 narratives.	 An	 identity	 is	 fluid	 is	when	
states	 have	 several	 identities	 and	 leaders	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 activate	 and	 deactivate	 these	
narratives.	
3. Ideational	and	Material	Forces:	When	Do	They	Matter?		
States	 operate	 in	 a	 structure	 and	 face	 ideational	 as	 well	 as	 material	 constraints	 and	
opportunities,	which	contribute	to	their	assessment	of	threats.	The	task	ahead	is,	therefore,	to	
specify	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 identities	 shapes	 material	 considerations	 in	 threat	
perception	and	vice	versa.	When	states	are	 faced	with	 ideational	and	material	 threats,	we	can	
discern	between	four	possibilities.	
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	The	 first	 possibility	 is	 when	 state	 identity	 is	 fixed,	 and	meanwhile	 the	 distribution	 of	
military	capabilities	comes	with	limited	policy	options	to	ensure	state’s	physical	security.	In	this	
situation,	 state’s	 security	 is	 endangered,	 and	 state	 identity	 is	 a	 constraining	 factor.	 If	 identity	
narrative	 converges	 with	 strategic	 policy	 ensuring	 physical	 security,	 then	 leaders	 would	
prioritize	 one	 or	 the	 other.	 Then	 the	 interplay	 between	 identity	 and	material	 interest	 can	 go	
either	way	 ().	 In	 this	 situation,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 expect	 how	 states	will	 perceive	 threats.	 The	
second	 possibility	 is	 a	 situation	where	 state	 identity	 is	 fixed	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	military	
capabilities	presents	multiple	policy	options,	which	leads	to	debates	among	the	ruling	elite.	In	
this	 situation,	 regime	 will	 perceive	 threats	 to	 their	 identity	 as	 more	 eminent.	 Regimes	 will,	
therefore,	 attempt	 to	 reinforce	 their	 identity	 narrative.	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	 the	
perception	of	material	power	distribution	is	shaped	and	guided	by	the	dictates	of	the	identity.	
Moreover,	regimes	are	likely	to	frame	their	preferred	course	of	action	in	terms	of	identity.		
	 The	third	situation	is	when	regimes	have	multiple	identity	narratives,	whereas	the	power	
distribution	 comes	 with	 limited	 policy	 choices	 ensuring	 the	 state’s	 physical	 security.	 In	 this	
situation,	 states	 perceive	 threats	 to	 their	 physical	 security	 as	more	 eminent.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	
material	interest	is	likely	to	determine	which	identity	is	selected	and	carries	the	day	within	the	
regime	 narrative.	 Regime	 identity,	 henceforth,	 undergoes	 reframing	 and	 adjustment	 to	
accommodate	 these	 material	 constraints.	 The	 fourth	 situation	 is	 when	 the	 distribution	 of	
military	 capabilities	 provides	 the	 state	with	multiple	 policy	 choices	 in	 its	 pursuit	 of	 physical	
security,	 and	 the	 regime	 also	 holds	 multiple	 identities.	 This	 situation	 provides	 elites	 with	
freedom	 of	 manoeuvre	 in	 pursuing	 physical	 and	 identity	 security.	 It	 is,	 however,	 difficult	 to	
predetermine	which	 factor	 identity	narrative	will	 connect	with	a	particular	policy	option	and	
which	connection	will	prevail	().	The	empirical	cases	examined	in	this	article	apply	to	the	
second	and	third	situations.	The	first	and	fourth	situations	provides	intriguing	areas	for	future	
research.	
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Physical	Security	 	 Regime	Identity	 	
	 	 Fixed	Identity	
(single	identity)	
Fluid	Identity	
(multiple	identities)	
Limited	strategic	
policy	choices	
Multiple	strategic		
policy	choices	
Identity		material	forces	 Material	forces		Identity	
(the	case	of	Syria)	
Identity		material	forces	
(the	case	of	Saudi	Arabia)	
Identity		material	forces	
Figure	(1):	Ideational	and	Material	Forces	in	Threat	Perception	
	
This	conceptual	framework	is	deployed	to	examine	the	divergent	Saudi	and	Syrian	threat	
perceptions	during	the	Iran‐Iraq	War	(1980–1988).	Although	both	Syria	and	Saudi	Arabia	share	
gegraphic	 proximity	 with	 Iraq	 and	 were	 both	 threatened	 by	 the	 message	 of	 the	 Islamic	
revolution,	Saudi	Arabia	perceived	the	ideational	threat	of	the	Islamic	revolution	as	prominent,	
whereas	Syria	considered	Iraq’s	military	threat	as	more	salient.	Through	a	‘structured,	focused	
comparison’,	5	these	case	studies	are	examined	as	a	‘plausibility	probe'	for	the	above	theoretical	
framework.	Plausibility	probe	cases	are	used	as	a	preliminary	stage	of	 inquiry	to	examine	the	
potential	validity	of	a	 theoretical	argument	prior	 to	 testing.	As	Eckstein	 (1991,	148)	 states,	 ‘a	
plausibility	 probe	 into	 theory	may	 simply	 attempt	 to	 establish	 that	 a	 theoretical	 construct	 is	
worth	considering	at	all.’	
	 In	the	remainder	of	this	article,	I	examine	why	Saudi	Arabia	and	Syria	diverged	in	their	
threat	 perception,	 despite	 their	 shared	 vulnerability	 toward	 the	 message	 of	 the	 Islamic	
																																																													
5	The	method	of	‘structured,	focused	comparison’	is	‘structured’	because	the	research	examines	each	case	
by	‘asking	a	set	of	standardized,	general	questions	(…)	these	questions	[are]	carefully	developed	to	reflect	
the	research	objective	and	theoretical	focus	of	inquiry’.	It	is	‘focused’	because	it	‘deals	only	with	specific	
aspects	of	the	historical	cases	examined’	(George	and	Bennett	2005,	67–69).	
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revolution	and	their	geographic	proximity	to	Iraq.	The	Saudi	case	illustrates	a	situation	where	
the	state	identity	is	fixed	while	the	distribution	of	military	capabilities	presented	the	leadership	
with	multiple	 otpions.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 leaders	perceived	 the	 ideational	 challenge	 to	 be	more	
salient.	Under	 these	conditions,	 identity	delineated	the	realm	of	choices	 that	 the	political	elite	
regarded	 as	 being	 in	 their	 regime’s	 material	 interest.	 The	 Syrian	 case	 illustrates	 a	 situation,	
where	 the	 regime	 identity	 included	 multiple	 narratives,	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 military	
capabilities	 imposed	 threats	 emerging	 from	 the	military	 capabilities	 of	 Iraq	 and	 Israel.	 These	
material	 constraints	 left	 the	 Syrian	 regimes	with	 limited	policy	options	 to	 ensure	 its	 physical	
security.	 Rather	 than	 shaping	 the	 perception	 of	 material	 power,	 the	 regime’s	 identity	 was	
subject	to	reinterpretation	to	accommodate	the	material	constraints.	
SAUDI	ARABIA	
MULTIPLE	STRATEGIC	OPTIONS	AND	FIXED	IDENTITY	
It	may	make	sense	to	expect	that	states	will	rely	on	simplified	rules	of	thumb,	such	as	ignoring	
identity,	especially	when	 the	regime’s	material	 security	 is	 endangered.	However,	 this	was	not	
the	case	for	Saudi	Arabia	during	the	Iran–Iraq	War,	when	it	supported	an	aspiring	Iraq	against	a	
militarily	 weakened	 Iran.	 The	 external	 shock	 of	 the	 Islamic	 revolution	 and	 the	 subsequent	
change	in	the	balance	of	power	in	favour	of	Iraq	provided	the	Kingdom	with	multiple	strategic	
options.	Meanwhile,	 the	Saudi	regime’s	 identity,	which	was	 fixed,	played	the	dominant	role	 in	
the	regime’s	threat	perception.	As	Saudi	Arabia	sought	to	distinguish	its	state	identity	from	the	
Iranian	 pan‐Islamic	 plea,	 the	 traditional	 component	 of	 this	 identity—Wahhabism—provided	
guidance	and	operated	as	a	channel	through	which	the	elite	perceived	the	balance	of	power.	The	
Saudi	 case	 illustrates	 the	 second	 situation	 in	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	 according	 to	 which	
identity	 is	 fixed	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 military	 capabilities	 offered	 the	 ruling	 elite	 multiple	
policy	options	to	ensure	the	Kingdom’s	physical	security.	Therefore,	the	elite	perceived	threats	
to	 identity	 as	 more	 eminent,	 which	 shaped	 their	 perception	 of	 the	 balance	 of	 power.	 To	
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illustrate	 this	 argument,	 this	 section	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 parts.	 First,	 I	 present	 the	 strategic	
conditions	 facing	 the	 Kingdom	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Islamic	 revolution.	 Second,	 I	 explore	 how	
identity	risks	emerged	and	framed	Saudi	threat	perception.	
1. The	Strategic	Balance	of	Power:	‘A	Structure	without	an	Instruction	Sheet’6	
Although	the	Saudi	support	for	Iraq	seemed	assertive	at	the	outbreak	of	the	Iran–Iraq	War,	the	
decision	to	provide	this	support	was	preceded	by	a	long	period	of	debate	among	the	ruling	elite,	
from	 roughly	 January	 1979	 to	 September	 1980.	 Before	 1979,	 Saudi	 Arabia	was	 successful	 in	
pursuing	 separate	 and	 incompatible	 strategies	 in	 different	 areas:	 the	 Gulf,	 the	 Arab–Israeli	
conflict,	and	the	partnership	with	the	United	States.	In	1979,	the	political‐military	environment	
altered	and	the	Kingdom	seemed	to	be	facing	challenges	to	its	ideational	and	material	security.	
The	 royal	 elite	was,	 therefore,	 compelled	 to	make	 new	 strategic	 choices	 to	 face	 these	 critical	
changes.	
In	 the	 Gulf	 throughout	 the	 1970s,	 Saudi	 Arabia	 was	 successful	 in	 maintaining	 an	
equilibrium	 that	 allowed	 it	 significant	 room	 to	 manoeuvre	 in	 the	 region	 by	 playing	 off	 Iraq	
against	Iran,	and	vice	versa	(Safran	1988,	chap	10).	The	Islamic	revolution	marked	a	change	in	
the	 balance	 of	 power	 to	 what	 can	 be	 described	 as	 parity	 between	 Iran	 and	 Iraq.	 Ayatollah	
Khomeini's	first	act	after	seizing	power	in	February	1979	was	to	deliberately	destroy	the	Shah's	
well‐trained	 professional	military,	 regarded	 as	 disloyal	 to	 the	 Islamic	 regime.	 Approximately	
5,000	 of	 the	 most	 experienced	 officers,	 mostly	 trained	 in	 the	 United	 States	 or	 Israel,	 were	
executed;	thousands	more	were	imprisoned	or	exiled	(Segal	1988,	952–3).	By	some	estimates,	
30	to	59	per	cent	of	the	highest‐ranking	officers,	mainly	majors	and	colonels,	were	killed.	Iran's	
army	in	1980	was	about	half	of	what	 it	had	been	in	1979	(down	from	approximately	415,000	
men	to	240,000	men).	Military	spending	fell	from	15	per	cent	of	GNP	to	7.3	per	cent	(Cashman	
and	Robinson	2007,	279).	In	short,	Iran	set	about	destroying	its	military	capability	to	threaten	
its	neighbours	or	defend	itself.		
																																																													
6This	title	is	based	on	Blyth	(2003).	
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Iraq,	 supported	 by	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 profiting	 from	 the	 oil	 windfall	 of	 1973/74,	
increased	 its	military	 capabilities	 throughout	 the	1970s.	By	1980,	 its	military	had	doubled	 in	
size	(to	242,000	men).	In	addition,	its	military	spending	had	jumped	from	14	per	cent	of	GNP	in	
1972	to	21	per	cent	in	1980.	Hence,	the	military	balance	tilted	toward	parity	between	Iran	and	
Iraq.	 In	the	absence	of	an	Iranian	regional	role	following	the	revolution,	Saddam	Hussein	took	
the	chance	to	assert	the	regional	role	of	Iraq	in	the	Gulf	and	the	Arab	world.	Saudi	Arabia	was	
unable	to	utilize	 its	old	strategy	of	playing	Iraq	and	Iran	off	against	one	another.	Saudi	Arabia	
and	the	Gulf	states	were	quite	aware	that	Iran	was	not	interested	in	war	against	its	neighbours,	
including	 Iraq.	 Ahmad	 Abdulaziz	 al‐Jassim,	 from	 the	 Kuwait	 Foreign	 Ministry,	 described	 the	
situation	as	follows:			
In	April	1980,	an	attempt	was	made	on	Tariq	‘Aziz’s	[the	Iraqi	foreign	minister]	life	and	
there	were	some	clashes	along	the	Iran‐Iraq	border.	At	that	time,	Iran	offered	us	to	sell	
their	 Phantom	 airplanes	 to	 Kuwait.	When	we	 told	 them	we	were	 not	 interested,	 they	
asked	us	to	relay	the	offer	to	the	Saudis.	They	were	not	interested	either.	This	showed	us	
that	Iran	was	not	thinking	of	entering	a	war	(quoted	in	Marschall	2003,	67).	
It	is,	therefore,	unclear	why	a	country	ready	to	sell	its	air	force	was	consistently	identified	
as	 a	 primary	 source	 of	 danger	 to	 its	 neighbours.	 Additionally,	 the	 offence–defence	 balance	
demonstrated	 Iran's	 inability	 to	 pose	 a	 military	 threat	 to	 the	 Gulf	 compared	 to	 Iraq.	 Iran	 is	
separated	from	Saudi	Arabia	by	a	buffer	state	(Iraq)	and	an	oceanic	moat	(the	Gulf),	and	lacked	
the	necessary	technological	capabilities	to	project	its	power	beyond	these	barriers.	By	contrast,	
Iraq	had	a	large	standing	army	positioned	at	an	easily	passable	land	border,	a	threat	that	later	
materialized	during	the	Gulf	War	(1991).	
The	situation	became	difficult	when	tensions	emerged	in	the	US–Saudi	partnership.	In	the	
Gulf,	 the	 loss	of	 the	Shah	undermined	 the	United	States’	 reliability	as	a	security	asset	 to	Arab	
monarchies	 (Lippman	 2004,	 209).	 US	 efforts	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 new	 regime	 in	 Iran	 further	
strained	 the	US–Saudi	partnership.	 The	United	 States’	 refusal	 to	provide	 asylum	 for	 the	 Shah	
underscored	the	Saudi	fear	that	the	United	States	would	not	protect	their	regime	(Safran	1988,	
354).	Also,	the	US	sponsorship	of	the	Camp	David	Accords	led	to	serious	difficulty	in	the	Saudi–
US	partnership	as	Washington	proposed	linking	the	protection	of	the	kingdom	to	Saudi	support	
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for	 the	Egyptian–Israeli	peace	treaty.	 In	short,	alongside	the	changes	 in	 the	Gulf,	 the	Kingdom	
found	it	even	harder	to	maintain	the	balance	between	cordial	relations	with	the	United	States	
and	its	independent	status	in	the	Arab–Israeli	conflict	and	the	Islamic	world	in	general	(Safran	
1988,	231).		
The	royal	elite	was	compelled	to	make	policy	decisions	with	far‐reaching	implications	for	
the	regional	configuration.	They	wavered	between	two	options	ensuring	the	Kingdom’s	physical	
security.	The	first	was	balancing	Iraq’s	military	ascendance	by	supporting	a	weakened	Iran	and	
befriending	 the	 nationalist	 Arab	 camp—namely	 Syria	 and	 the	 Palestinian	 Liberation	
Organization	 (PLO)—in	 the	Arab–Israeli	 sphere.	 Such	 a	 choice	would	mean	defying	 the	 long‐
term	strategic	relationship	with	the	United	States	and	incurring	the	hostility	of	Iraq.	This	would	
also	mean	 improving	 the	 Saudi	 relationship	with	Moscow	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 relationship	
with	Washington.	The	second	option	was	going	along	with	Iraq	and	giving	up	on	the	balance	in	
the	 Gulf.	 This	 would	 mean	 accepting	 Iraq’s	 regional	 hegemony	 and	 depending	 more	 on	 the	
United	States	for	security.	This	second	option	would	imply	the	Saudis’	support	for	the	Egyptian–
Israeli	peace	treaty	and	bring	about	the	hostility	of	Syria	and	Iran.		
The	 choice	 between	 these	 two	 strategic	 options	 created	 tensions	within	 the	 royal	 elite,	
which	 was	 divided	 between	 those	 for	 supporting	 Iraq	 and	 those	 for	 befriending	 Iran.	 A	
conservative	 faction,	 led	 by	King	Khalid	 and	Prince	Abdullah,	 favoured	 befriending	 Syria	 and	
welcoming	 the	 Islamic	 fervour	 of	 the	 new	 Iranian	 regime.	 This	 faction	 was	 supported	 by	 a	
younger	generation	in	the	family	led	by	Saud	Al‐Faisal	that	advocated	for	the	strengthening	of	
Saudi	ties	with	the	nationalist	Arab	Camp	and	for	the	improvement	of	relations	with	Moscow	at	
the	expense	of	the	reliance	on	the	United	States	(Samore	1983,	416–422;	Abir	1993,	127–	128).	
The	 opposing	 faction—led	 by	 Crown	 Prince	 Fahd	 and	 Sultan—advocated	 a	 pro‐US	 stance	
stemming	from	a	deep	hostility	to	the	Soviets.		
2. The	Regime	Identity:	A	Tradition	Reinforced	
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While	 the	distribution	of	military	 capabilities	provided	 the	Saudis	with	policies	 to	 ensure	 the	
Kingdom’s	 physical	 security,	 the	 regime’s	 identity	was	 fixed.	 The	 Saudis	 perceived	 the	 threat	
emanating	 from	 the	 Islamic	 revolution	 as	 more	 salient.	 Since	 the	 Kingdom’s	 foundation,	 the	
Saudi	regime	identity	has	been	based	on	the	appropriation	of	Islamic	symbols	and	has	included	
claims	 such	 as	 ‘our	 constitution	 is	 the	 Quran’	 and	 the	 application	 of	 shari'a.	 Islam	 and	 its	
Wahhabi	 interpretation	 have	 played	 a	 role	 in	 consolidating	 the	 Saudi	 regime	 identity	 (Nevo	
1998).7	As	 the	 sole	 Islamic	 model	 in	 the	 region	 prior	 to	 the	 Islamic	 revolution,	 the	 Saudi	
Kingdom	propagated	 this	myth	 to	 distinguish	 itself	 from	 the	 so‐called	 secular	Arab	 republics	
(Al‐Yassini	1983,	12–15).	When	the	Islamic	revolution	broke	out,	the	Kingdom	feared	losing	its	
unique	Islamic	credentials.	For	the	first	time,	Wahhabism	expanded	from	the	domestic	sphere,	
as	the	state	religion	and	source	of	legitimacy,	to	the	foreign	policy	sphere,	becoming	a	source	of	
uniqueness	for	the	regime’s	identity.	
As	opposed	to	other	republics	in	the	Arab	world,	where	nationalism	was	based	on	ethnic	
elements	combined	with	the	struggle	against	colonialism,	the	Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia	was	not	
formed	on	the	basis	of	a	‘national'	identity	(Kostiner	1990).	Since	it	contains	within	its	borders	
two	 of	 the	 three	 holy	 cities	 of	 Islam—Mecca	 and	 Medina—Islam	 (namely,	 the	 Wahhabi	
interpretation	of	Islam)	served	as	a	powerful	impetus	for	political	centralization	in	the	Arabian	
Peninsula.	The	Wahhabi	movement	provided	a	source	of	legitimacy	to	the	ruling	family	and	was	
a	 powerful	 tool	 for	 uniting	 various	 tribes	 and	 regions	 in	 loyalty	 to	 it.	 Al‐Rasheed	 (2006,	 4)	
expressed	 the	 importance	of	Wahhabism	 to	 the	 Saudi	 state	 as	 follows:	 ‘Without	Wahhabiyya,	
there	would	have	been	no	al‐Saud	and	no	Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia’.	This	led	to	the	emergence	
of	a	 fixed	regime	identity	that	 imposed	heavy	constraints	on	the	Saudi	 leadership.	The	 lack	of	
any	other	national	 identity	made	any	threats	 to	 the	Kingdom’s	 identity	acute,	as	 the	Kingdom	
could	not	easily	reframe	or	readapt	its	identity.	
																																																													
7	Wahhabism	 refers	 to	 the	 Saudi	 variant	 of	 Salafiyya.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 term	 ‘Wahhabism’	 is	
problematic,	I	retain	it	as	it	is	commonly	used.	
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	 During	the	Iran‐Iraq	War,	Wahhabism	emerged	as	a	fixed	narrative	guiding	the	regime’s	
threat	perception.	While	Saudi	Arabia	wanted	to	remain	the	sole	Islamic	model	in	the	region,	the	
Islamic	 revolution	 downplayed	 Persian	 nationalism	 and	 promoted	 themes	 of	 Islamic	
universalism.	Khomeini	called	for	Muslim	unity	and	stressed	the	Palestinian	cause	as	an	Islamic	
one,	a	position	that	was	similar	to	the	Saudi	perspective.	Wehrey	et	al.	(2009,	22)	characterize	
Iranian	foreign	policy	as	‘Arab’	and	‘Sunni’.	As	a	result,	the	Kingdom	saw	the	foundations	of	its	
state	 identity	 eroded.	 Its	 position	 as	 the	 leader	 of	 pan‐Islamism	 was	 being	 challenged	 by	
another	 regime	 based	 on	 pan‐Islamic	 values.	 A	 Saudi	 official	 explicated	 this	 tension:	 ‘Iran's	
biggest	 struggle	 is	with	 Saudi	Arabia,	 not	with	 the	United	 States.	 Iran	wants	 to	 challenge	 the	
Saudi	version	of	Islam,	that	is	the	division	of	politics	and	religion'	(quoted	Marschall	2003,	48).	
As	Prince	Turki	Al‐Faisal	bin	Abdul	Aziz	Al	Saud	(2013,	38)8	put	it,	
Saudi	Arabia	is	the	Custodian	of	the	Two	Holy	Mosques,	and	the	Birthplace	of	Islam,	and	
as	 such	 it	 is	 the	 eminent	 leader	 of	 the	wider	Muslim	world.	 Iran	portrays	 itself	 as	 the	
leader	not	just	of	the	minority	Shiite	world,	but	of	all	Muslim	revolutionaries	interested	
in	standing	up	to	the	West.	
This	challenge	to	Saudi	identity	was	further	exacerbated	by	other	domestic	incidents.	The	
first	 event	 was	 Juhaymān	 al‐‘Utaybı̄’s	 seizure	 of	 the	 Mecca	 Mosque	 on	 20	 November	 1979.	
Employing	 a	 discourse	 grounded	 in	 the	Wahhabi	 tradition,	 Juhaymān	 accused	 the	 regime	 of	
deviating	 from	 Islamic	 values	 (Al‐Rasheed	 2006,	 105).9		 Moreover,	 he	 accused	 the	 Ulama	 of	
interpreting	the	Quran	in	ways	that	served	the	non‐Islamic	policies	of	the	ruling	family.	Almost	
simultaneously,	the	Shiites	in	the	eastern	province	of	the	Saudi	Kingdom	staged	protests	on	28	
November	1979	(Goldberg	1986,	230).	Regime	security	approaches	argue	that	these	domestic	
problems	might	have	caused	 the	 threat	 to	 the	Saudi	 regime	and	 led	 the	elite	 to	 reframe	 their	
identity.	 I	 argue	 that	 domestic	 dimension	 on	 its	 own	 could	 not	 pose	 an	 identity	 risk	 to	 the	
regime.	There	is	no	compelling	evidence	that	Iran	was	involved	in	Saudi	internal	affairs;	only	a	
																																																													
8	Turki	al‐Faisal	was	director	of	the	Saudi	general	intelligence	service	between	1977	and	2001.	
9	The	 seizure	 of	Mecca	was	 an	 event	 independent	 from	 the	 Islamic	 revolution.	 For	more	details	 on	Al‐
‘Utaybı’̄s	movement,	cf.	Hegghammer	and	Lacroix		(2007).	
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small	number	of	Shiite	clerics	in	Saudi	Arabia	were	inspired	by	Khomeini’s	speeches	(Ibrahim	
2006,	117).	These	domestic	dissents	magnified	the	lapses	in	the	regime’s	 identity	narrative	 in	
facing	 the	 threat	 of	 the	 Iranian	 revolution.	Moreover,	 the	 inability	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 to	 rely	 on	
other	sources	of	identity	increased	the	leaders’	perception	of	this	ideational	threat. 
While	 looking	 to	distinguish	 the	 Saudi	 version	of	 Islam	 from	 the	 Iranian	 one,	 the	 Saudi	
ruling	elite	reinforced	the	traditional	ideas	embedded	in	the	Saudi	regime's	historical	origins—
namely,	Wahhabism.	The	 emergence	of	Wahhabism	as	 a	 foreign	policy	 resource	 reflected	 the	
regime’s	ceaseless	quest	to	make	Saudi	Arabia	unique	in	the	region.	These	efforts	were	manifest	
in	many	ways.	First,	in	1984,	King	Fahd	adopted	a	new,	more	Islamic,	national	anthem.	Second,	
in	 1986,	 he	 changed	 his	 title	 from	 ‘His	Majesty'	 to	 ‘Guardian	 of	 Two	Holy	 Places'	 (Marschall	
2003,	48).	In	addition,	the	power	of	the	‘ulama	was	strengthened	and	the	conservative	Wahhabi	
Sunni	 image	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 was	 promoted	 via	 a	 sectarian	 rhetorical	 discourse	 against	 the	
perceived	enemy,	 ‘Iran’.	By	granting	the	 ‘ulama	more	control	over	social	and	religious	life,	 the	
regime	reinforced	a	stricter	Wahhabi	code	of	conduct	(Steinberg	2005).		
Furthermore,	 the	 Kingdom	 reinforced	 a	 representation	 of	 the	 ‘Saudi‐Wahhabi	 self'	
contrasted	 with	 the	 ‘Iranian‐Shi'a	 other'.	 Traditional	 Wahhabism	 demonized	 Shiites	 as	 ‘the	
incarnation	of	infidelity,	and	(...)	polytheists’,	making	it	the	duty	of	believers	‘to	manifest	enmity	
to	the	polytheists	[who]	were	perceived	as	unbelievers	(kufār),	and	were	therefore	liable	to	the	
severest	 sanctions,	 including	 that	 of	 holy	 war	 (jihad)’	 (Goldberg	 1986,	 232).	 This	 Saudi	
portrayal	of	Shi'ism	was	often	associated	with	the	word	al‐rāfiḍa	(defectors),10	which	placed	the	
Iranian	regime	outside	of	the	Muslim	community.	This	discourse	of	exclusion,	based	on	religious	
otherness	 framed	within	 religious	 dogma,	 was	 intended	 to	 highlight	 Saudi	 Arabia’s	 religious	
uniqueness,	which	was	necessary	to	forge	a	distinct	state‐identity	narrative.	
																																																													
10	This	 term	 is	 now	 used	 by	 Saudi	Wahhabi	 clerics	 to	 refer	 to	 Shi’a	 Muslims	 as	 rejecting	 the	 Prophet	
Muhammad’s	Sunnah	(path).	
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The	emergence	of	 the	Saudi	 identity	as	 the	primary	motivator	behind	 threat	perception	
resulted	 from	 a	 fixed	 regime	 identity	 that	 provided	 constraints,	 while	 the	 distribution	 of	
military	capabilities	offered	Saudi	 leaders	several	policy	option	to	ensure	physical	security.	 In	
an	 effort	 to	 preserve	 and	 reinforce	 their	 identity,	 Saudi	 leaders	 supported	 Saddam	 Hussein	
against	 the	militarily	weakened	 revolutionary	 regime.	 This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 Saudi	 Arabia	
ultimately	 gave	up	material	 security	 concerns;	 Saudi	Arabia	 remained	worried	about	 Saddam	
Hussein's	regional	aspirations.		Nevertheless,	the	message	of	the	Islamic	revolution	constituted	
a	threat	to	the	Saudi	regime	identity,	which	was	fixed	and	lack	any	manoeuvre	for	adaptation.	
	
SYRIA	
	LIMITED	STRATEGIC	OPTIONS	AND	FLUID	IDENTITY	
If	Wahhabism	and	its	fixity	as	a	regime	identity	shaped	Saudi	threat	perception,	Syria	illustrates	
the	 case	of	 a	 regime	 identity	 that	 adjusted	and	 adapted	 to	 the	dictates	of	 the	material	power	
distribution.	 The	 Syrian	 case	 illustrates	 the	 third	 situation	 in	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	
according	to	which	the	regime	disposes	of	multiple	identity	narrative	whereas	the	distribution	
of	 military	 capabilities	 offered	 only	 limited	 option	 to	 ensure	 Syria’	 physical	 security.	 This	
section	 discusses	why	 and	 how	 the	 Arab‐nationalist	 Syrian	 regime,	 a	 subscriber	 to	 a	 secular	
Ba'athist	 ideology,	 supported	 non‐Arab	 Iran,	 an	 Islamic	 regime	 bent	 on	 exporting	 its	
revolutionary	 theological	 doctrine	 against	 Iraq,	 an	 Arab	 and	 Ba'athist	 regime.	 The	 Syrian	
decision	to	align	with	Iran	was	arguably	shaped	by	Syria’s	limited	strategic	option,	which	led	to	
the	violation	of	Syrian	regime	identity,	namely	pan‐Arabism.	I,	first,	examine	Syrian	geopolitical	
imperatives	throughout	the	1970s	and	the	challenges	driving	its	alliance	with	Iran	on	the	eve	of	
the	 Iran–Iraq	War.	 I,	 then,	 outline	 how	 the	 regime’s	 identity	 changed	 from	pan‐Arabism	 to	 a	
more	state‐centric	model	to	accommodate	and	adapt	to	the	new	balance	of	power.		
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1. The	Strategic	Balance	of	Power:	Limited	Options	
While	 the	events	of	1979	presented	multiple	policy	choices	 for	 the	Saudi	 leaders,	 their	Syrian	
counterparts	were	 constrained	 and	 their	 options	were	 limited.	 Syria	 conventionally	 faced	 an	
unfavourable	 regional	 balance	 of	 power.	 Amid	 its	 struggle	 against	 Israel,	 Syria's	 need	 for	
regional	allies	became	severe	following	the	1967	Arab	defeat.	Throughout	the	1970s,	al‐Assad	
built	a	constructive	relationship	with	fellow	Arab	countries:	he	allied	with	Egypt,	terminated	the	
Syrian	isolation	imposed	by	the	oil	monarchies,	and	pursued	a	détente	with	Iraq	(Salloukh	2000,	
400–401).	The	success	of	this	strategy	was	displayed	in	the	emergence	of	the	Damascus‐Riyadh‐
Cairo	 axis	 during	 the	 1973	war	 (Sunayama	2007,	 37–41).	 In	 1979,	 however,	 Syria	was	 again	
isolated;	al‐Assad's	strategy	to	maintain	Syria	as	the	centre	of	the	Arab	world	collapsed	due	to	
events	 beyond	 Syria's	 control.	 These	 events	 included	 the	 Egyptian–Israeli	 Peace	 Treaty,	 the	
degradation	of	Syrian–Iraqi	relations,	and	the	Islamic	revolution	in	Iran.	
The	 Egyptian–Syrian	 alliance	 quickly	 collapsed	 in	 the	 post‐war	 period.	 In	 1979,	 the	
signing	 of	 Egyptian–Israeli	 peace	 treaty	 raised	 a	 severe	 dilemma	 for	 Syria.	 In	 one	move,	 the	
treaty	removed	the	Arab	world’s	strongest	actor	from	the	Arab–Israeli	stage	and	left	the	Syrian	
regime	 severely	 exposed.	 Feeling	 betrayed,	 al‐Assad	 denounced	 al‐Sadat’s	 visit	 in	 November	
1977	to	Jerusalem	and	pursued	three	major	goals	from	1977	until	1979:	(1)	to	increase	Syria’s	
military	build‐up	with	more	 reliance	on	 the	Soviet	Union;	 (2)	 to	mobilize	 an	Arab	opposition	
front	 to	 isolate	Egypt;	 and	 (3)	 to	 find	 other	Arab	partners	 to	 counterbalance	 Israel’s	military	
capabilities.	However,	these	efforts	were	unsuccessful.	
The	 breakdown	 of	 the	 Egyptian–Syrian	 alliance	 convinced	 the	 Syrian	 elite	 that	 self‐
reliance	in	defence	was	a	fundamental	requirement	of	the	new	balance‐of‐power	equation.	The	
regime	 initiated	 a	 military	 build‐up,	 known	 as	 the	 ‘strategic	 parity'	 policy.	 This	 effort	 was	
however	 unsuccessful	 in	 achieving	 such	 parity	with	 Israel	 (Kandil	 2008,	 428).	 Alongside	 this	
internal	balancing	strategy,	Syria	worked	to	marginalize	Egypt	and	mobilize	the	Eastern	front	to	
counterbalance	 Israel’s	 military	 superiority.	 Less	 than	 three	 weeks	 after	 al‐Sadat’s	 visit	 to	
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Jerusalem,	 Syria,	 South	 Yemen,	 Algeria,	 Libya	 and	 the	 PLO	 formed	 the	 Steadfastness	 and	
Confrontation	Front	 (Jabhat	al‐Ṣumūd	wa	al‐Taṣadī).	This	 front	had	 the	potential	 to	 act	 as	 the	
most	important	inter‐Arab	force	in	the	Arab–Israeli	sphere.	However,	this	Arab	quasi‐consensus	
was	short‐lived.		
Alternatively,	 the	 Syrian	 regime	 set	 its	 sights	 on	 Baghdad	 as	 the	 primary	 regional	
partner	that	could	fill	the	vacuum	caused	by	Egypt’s	formal	exit	from	the	Arab	camp.	Given	its	
military	 capabilities,	 Iraq	was	 the	only	Arab	state	 capable	of	 counterbalancing	 Israel's	power.	
The	Syrian	quest	for	an	alternative	Arab	ally	converged	with	an	Iraqi	regional	bid	to	fill	the	gap	
and	 to	play	a	 leading	role	 in	 the	Arab	system.	 In	1979,	Syria’s	critical	vulnerability	and	 Iraq’s	
regional	ambitions	brought	about	what	Kienle	(1990,	135)	termed	a	‘marriage	contre	nature’.	A	
rapprochement	between	the	two	Ba’athist	regimes	had	taken	place	from	1978	until	mid‐1979.	
In	 his	 February	 1991	 speech	 to	 the	 secretaries	 and	 members	 of	 the	 Ba’ath	 Party’s	 branch	
commands,	Abdul	Halim	Khaddam	explained	Syrian	foreign	policy	towards	Iraq	in	this	period	as	
follows:	‘Syria’s	starting‐point	was	to	hold	onto	Iraq	in	any	way,	because	after	Egypt’s	exit	[from	
the	Arab	camp]	we	felt	that	the	great	[regional]	balance	was	upset	as	a	result	of	its	exit,	and	that	
we	had	to	act	in	a	swift	manner,	and	with	all	our	energies,	to	restore	the	balance	to	the	region’	
(quoted	 in	 Salloukh	 2000,	 432).	 However,	 with	 the	 ascendance	 of	 Saddam	 Hussein	 to	 the	
presidency	 in	 1979,	 the	 Syrian	 strategy	 of	 relying	 on	 Iraq	 to	 balance	 against	 Israel	 proved	
unsuccessful	and	Baghdad	turned	from	being	an	asset	into	the	most	dangerous	of	Syria’s	Arab	
neighbours	in	less	than	a	year.		
When	the	partnership	between	Iraq	and	Syria	formally	failed,	Saudi	Arabia	consolidated	
a	new	entente	with	 Iraq,	 leaving	Syria	 isolated.	On	17	September	1979,	Saudi	Minister	of	 the	
Interior	 Prince	 Nayef	 concluded	 an	 agreement	 with	 Iraq	 on	 security	 cooperation	 (Ramazani	
1986,	 73).	 Damascus	 became	 even	 more	 powerless	 when	 a	 parallel	 Jordanian–Iraqi	
rapprochement	 developed	 (Taylor	 1982).	 An	 emerging	Riyadh–Baghdad–Amman	 axis	 further	
alienated	Damascus.	This	 isolation	 affected	 Syria’s	 position	on	 the	Arab–Israeli	 front,	 and	 the	
emerging	parity	between	 Iran	and	 Iraq	was	another	 source	of	 fear	 for	 al‐Assad's	 regime.	The	
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Iraqi	 aspiration	 to	 regional	 hegemony	was	manifested	 in	 its	military	 build‐up.	 Following	 the	
increase	 in	oil	prices	during	 the	1970s,	 Iraq's	army	doubled	 in	size,	 reaching	242,000	men	 in	
1979.	 It’s	 defence	 expenditures	 increased	 to	 US$2.67	 billion	 (The	Military	 Balance	 1980:42).	
Ultimately,	Syria	had	to	deal	with	Israel’s	military	supremacy	and	with	Iraq’s	ascent,	which	was	
not	only	destabilizing	on	the	ideological	level,	but	also	posing	a	military	threat	(Marschall	1992).	
Both	states	shared	long	borders	with	Syria	and	had	considerable	projection	capabilities.	
Syria’s	exposure	to	Israel’s	military	supremacy	and	Iraq’s	hegemonic	aspirations,	and	its	
isolation	in	inter‐Arab	politics,	coincided	with	the	Islamic	revolution	in	Iran.	As	Damascus	had	
long	 considered	 the	 Shah’s	 regime	 to	 be	 pro‐Israeli,	 the	 overthrow	 of	 the	monarchy	 and	 the	
advent	 of	 a	 regime	 that	 was	 not	 aligned	 with	 Israel	 constituted	 an	 opportunity	 for	 Syria	 to	
balance	 Israel	 and,	more	 importantly,	 to	 end	 its	 isolation	within	 the	Arab	world.	As	Hafez	 al‐
Assad	openly	stated,		
This	revolution	introduced	substantial	changes	in	the	strategic	balance…	[Iran]	supports	
the	Arabs,	without	hesitation	[…]	for	the	sake	of	liberating	our	lands	[…]	How	can	we	[…]	
lose	 a	 country	 like	 Iran	 of	 the	 Islamic	 revolution	 […]	with	 all	 its	 human,	military,	 and	
economic	potential.	(quoted	in	Ehteshami	and	Hinnebusch	1997,	93)	
The	outbreak	of	the	Iran–Iraq	War	in	September	1980	constituted	an	acute	challenge	to	
the	 Syrian	 regime.	 Already	 facing	 an	 unbalanced	 Israel,	 Syria	 had	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 regional	
consequences	 of	 a	 potential	 Iraqi	 victory	 in	 the	 east.	 Khaddam	 portrayed	 Syria’s	 fear	 in	 this	
context	as	 follows:	 ‘the	 Iran‐Iraq	War	was	 two	wars:	one	against	 Iran	and	 the	second	against	
Syria’	(Baraka	2011).	Syria	sided	with	Iran	to	balance	against	security	threats	 from	Israel	and	
protect	 its	 regional	 position	 from	 an	 unbearable	 Iraqi	 victory.	 As	 Syria	 was	 having	 limited	
option	 to	 ensure	 its	 physical	 security,	 the	 regime	 identity	 narrative	 was	 adjusted	 to	
accommodate	the	regime’s	physical	security	needs.	
2. The	Syrian	Regime	Identity:	A	Strategic	Adaptation	
In	contrast	 to	Nasser’s	claim	that	Arabs	should	only	unite	with	Arabs,	al‐Assad	aligned	with	a	
non‐Arab	state,	 thereby	challenging	Arab	states	across	 the	Gulf.	 In	doing	so,	al‐Assad	violated	
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the	very	basic	norm	of	his	regime’s	identity,	which	thus	led	to	a	change	in	its	content.	However,	
this	 violation	 of	 pan‐Arabism	 reflects	 a	 more	 complex	 process.	 While	 the	 material	 power	
distribution	offered	limited	policy	option	ensuring	Syria’	physical	security,	the	regime	identity	
was	multilayered	and	included	multiple	narratives.	The	constraints	imposed	by	distribution	of	
military	capabilities	dominated	Syria’s	threat	perception	and	determined	the	choice	of	identity	
narrative.	The	following	discussion	highlights	the	fluidity	in	the	Syrian	regime’s	identity	and	the	
changes	in	the	narrative,	which	were	driven	by	its	alliance	with	Iran	and	by	the	imbalance	in	the	
Arab–Israeli	sphere.	I	first	present	the	disparate	narratives	that	besieged	the	regime’s	identity:	
Syrian	nationalism	and	pan‐Arabism.	Then,	I	examine	the	changes	in	the	content	of	this	identity	
and	its	move	toward	a	more	defined	Syrian	nationalism	under	a	pan‐Arab	label.	I	argue	that	the	
Syrian	regime’s	 identity	underwent	two	main	changes.	First,	 it	became	more	distinct	 from	the	
‘Arab	Nation’.	More	precisely,	Syrian	nationalism	took	over	from	Arab	nationalism.	Second,	the	
pan‐Arab	component	of	Syrian	identity	was	narrowed	down,	and	its	meaning	altered	from	the	
unity	of	Arab	states	to	the	struggle	against	Israel.		
Throughout	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	Syrian	 regime’s	 identity	wavered	between	 two	
poles:	Arabism	and	Syrian	nationalism.	Arabism	represented	a	total	commitment	to	the	idea	of	
Arab	unity,	to	the	extent	of	denying	any	separate	identity	to	the	Syrian	entity.	At	the	other	pole,	
Syrian	 nationalism	 implied	 a	 total	 commitment	 to	 a	 distinct	 Syrian	 identity	 based	 on	 the	
establishment	of	a	greater	Syrian	state	within	the	natural	geographic	borders	of	Bilād	al‐Shām.	
Syrian	 leaders	 sought	 a	 middle	 ground.	 The	 Arab	 identity	 was	 portrayed	 as	 an	 overarching	
narrative	while	the	existence	of	a	Syrian	state	was	accepted.	By	bridging	these	two	dimensions,	
the	 Syrian	 regime	 created	 a	 vague	 and	 fluid	 identity	 encompassing	 competing	 multilayered	
narratives	(Phillips	2012).	
These	narratives	did	not	always	carry	equal	weight.	From	 independence	until	 the	 late	
1970s,	pan‐Arabism	remained	the	central	theme	in	the	Syrian	identity.	The	official	name	of	the	
new	republic,	‘The	Arab	Syrian	Republic’,	expressed	the	declared	order	of	the	various	sources	of	
the	 regime’s	 identity.	 Arab	 solidarity	 and	 unity	 occupied	 a	 privileged	 place	 in	 the	 regime’s	
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foreign	 policy	 discourse.	 Arab	 nationalist	 considerations	 often	 explained	 the	 regime's	 policy	
choices.	This	interpretation	of	Arabism,	though	imposed	by	the	elites,	reached	the	people,	who	
developed	 a	 real	 sense	 of	 integration	 into	 the	 larger	 ‘Arab	 Nation'	 and	 firmly	 believed	 in	 its	
realization.	 Public	 speeches	 and	 media	 statements	 were	 filled	 with	 references	 to	 the	 ‘Arab	
people'	 and	 the	 ‘Arab	 Umma',	 whereas	 references	 to	 the	 Syrian	 entity	 were	 ambiguous	 and	
minimal	(Kienle	1995,	58–61).	Arab	nationalism	was	portrayed	by	the	regime	as	the	struggle	to	
unite	the	Arab	lands,	stretching	from	Morocco	to	Iraq,	into	one	Arab	state	where	the	‘nation’	and	
the	‘state’	would	coincide	(Valbjørn	2009).	
Nevertheless,	the	calls	for	a	Syrian	nationalism	were	present	all	along,	even	though	the	
move	 towards	 the	 consolidation	 of	 this	 ‘territorial	 entity’	 into	 a	 ‘nation	 state’	 was	 slow	 and	
mitigated	 until	 1980.	 The	 failure	 of	 several	 Arab	 unity	 schemes	 and	 the	 different	 military	
clashes	 with	 neighbouring	 states—Israel,	 Lebanon,	 and	 Jordan—slowly	 led	 the	 Syrians	 to	
imagine	 and	 construct	 their	 own	 community.	 A	 sense	 of	 ‘otherness’	 within	 the	 Arab	 world	
slowly	developed,	and	a	consciousness	emerged	among	Syrians	that	they	were	not	just	Arabs	or	
Muslims,	but	that	they	belonged	to	a	state	called	‘Syria’.		
The	 two	 dominant	 regime‐identity	 narratives	 were	 in	 competition.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	
Arabism	 dictated	 that	 Syria	 support	 Iraq	 against	 Iran.	 However,	 such	 a	 policy	 choice	 would	
mean	 endangering	 Syria's	material	 interests,	 as	 the	 regime	 lacked	 the	 capability	 to	 fight	 two	
fronts,	Israel	and	Iran,	simultaneously.	On	the	other	hand,	Syrian	nationalism	dictated	support	
for	 Iran	 as	 the	 major	 ally	 in	 Syria's	 struggle	 against	 Israel.	 The	 material	 power	 distribution	
determined	 which	 of	 these	 narratives	 won	 out.	 As	 of	 1979,	 al‐Assad	 redefined	 the	 regime’s	
identity.	As	Sadowski	(2002,	151)	puts	it,	‘Assad	has	tended	to	act	as	neither	a	pan‐Arabist	nor	a	
pan‐Syrianist	but	a	Syrian’.	Accordingly,	the	content	of	Syria’s	identity	changed	spectacularly,	in	
a	 process	 that	 has	 often	 been	 described	 as	 the	 consolidation	 of	 the	 Syrian	 state	 and	 the	
redefinition	 of	 Arab	 nationalism	 in	 Syrian	 terms.	 Hinnebusch	 (2001,	 140)	 succinctly	
summarizes	such	change:	‘the	meaning	of	Arabism	[altered]	from	a	cause	for	which	Syria	would	
sacrifice	to	a	means	to	reach	Syrian	ends’.	
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This	change	was	illustrated	by	the	emergence	of	‘Syria'	as	a	relatively	autonomous	entity	
whose	 material	 interests	 were	 not	 necessarily	 compatible	 with	 those	 advocated	 by	 pan‐
Arabism.	 ‘Syria'	 replaced	 the	 ‘Arab	 Homeland'	 (al‐waṭan	al‐‘arabī)	 as	 the	 essential	 point	 of	
reference	 in	 the	 legitimation	 of	 government	 decisions.	 Even	 though	 al‐Assad	 and	 other	
representatives	 of	 the	 regime	 avoided	 using	 explicit	 notions	 to	 herald	 this	 change,	 they	
advanced	 implicit	 references	 to	 the	Syrians	as	a	distinct	entity.	After	1979,	al‐Assad	used	 ‘the	
Syrian	 people'	 instead	 of	 ‘the	 Arab	 people	 of	 Syria'	 in	 his	 speeches.	 Also,	 ‘the	 Syrian	 citizen'	
replaced	 ‘the	Arab	citizen	in	Syria'.	Additionally,	 the	policies	were	justified	as	being	in	 ‘Syria's	
qawmī	and	waṭanī	interest’,	or	at	least	serving	‘Syria’	(Kienle	1995).	
Pan‐Arabism,	the	overarching	regime	identity,	was	relegated	to	the	sidlines.	 Instead	of	
announcing	its	death,	the	regime	frayed	the	appeal	and	prevalence	of	pan‐Arabism	by	changing	
its	meaning.	Arabism	was	no	longer	defined	according	to	intrinsic	characteristics	such	as	Arab	
ethnicity	and	the	Arab	language.	Rather,	it	was	the	struggle	against	Israel	that	defined	who	the	
Arab	was	and	who	his	allies	were.	 In	other	words,	Arabism,	often	used	 in	the	pledge	for	Arab	
unity,	 became	 limited	 to	 Syria’s	 conflict	 with	 Israel.	 Thus,	 considering	 its	 change	 of	 strategy	
towards	 Israel	and	 its	commitment	 to	 the	Palestinian	cause,	 Iran	was	an	ally	compatible	with	
Syria’s	 new,	 nuanced	 Arab	 identity.	 The	 media	 foregrounded	 Khomeini’s	 support	 for	 the	
opposition	to	the	 Israeli–Egyptian	peace	settlement.	Al‐Thawra’s	headline	on	27	October	1979	
stated,	‘Iran:	we	are	in	the	same	Trench	as	the	Arabs’	(Kedar	2006,	179–180).	
	 Syrian	 foreign	 minister	 Fārūq	 al‐Shar‘	 stated	 this	 change	 in	 the	 Syrian	 conception	 of	
Arabism:		
It	 was	 not	 long	 after	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 Camp	 David	 accords	 in	 1979	 that	 the	 Islamic	
Republic	of	Iran	was	suddenly	attacked	for	no	reason.	The	attack	came	immediately	after	
the	 success	 of	 its	 revolution	 after	 it	 closed	 the	 Israeli	 embassy	 in	Tehran	 and	gave	 it	 to	
Palestine,	 and	 after	 it	 adopted	Arabic	 as	 an	official	 language	 in	 the	 country.	 It	was	 very	
strange	indeed	for	Muslim	Iran	to	be	attacked	by	an	Arab	capital	that	sponsored	the	Arab	
National	Charter	and	the	Arab	summit	(quoted	in	B.	Rubin	2000,	22).	
	 In	 short,	 pan‐Arabism	 was	 redefined	 to	 suit	 Syria’s	 military	 needs	 vis‐à‐vis	 Israel	 and	
became	 a	 concept	 void	 of	 its	 crucial	 component:	 Arabness.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 fixity	 of	
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Wahhabism	in	the	Saudi	case,	Syria’s	regime	identity	was	fluid	and	multi‐layered.	The	ideational	
challenge	 emerging	 from	 the	 Islamic	 revolution	 to	 the	 regime	 could	 be	 overcome	 through	
reframing	and	changing	the	overriding	narrative.	
CONCLUSION	
Neorealists	and	constructivists	fundamentally	agree	that	ideational	and	material	forces	matter	
in	 IR,	 but	 they	 remained	 biased	 toward	 one	 or	 the	 other.	 While	 previous	 eclectic	 works	
borrowing	 from	 more	 than	 one	 paradigm	 acknowledge	 the	 possibility	 of	 combining	 both	
elements,	 they	 remained	 confined	 to	 a	 structural	 approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 IR,	 and	 agents’	
behaviour	 has	 been	 overlooked.	 This	 article	 further	 contributes	 to	 analytical	 eclecticism	 by	
drawing	attention	to	the	conditions	under	which	ideational	and	material	forces	matter	in	actors’	
threat	perception.	By	probing	 the	plausibility	of	 this	argument	 through	 the	cases	of	Syria	and	
Saudi	Arabia,	 the	 article	 examines	 the	 two	 regimes’	 divergent	 threat	perceptions	 through	 the	
prism	of	the	interplay	between	regime	identity	and	a	regime’s	particular	position	in	the	regional	
structure.		
Both	Saudi	Arabia	and	Syria	faced	various	challenges.	Iraq’s	military	ambitions	emerged	
at	 a	 time	 when	 Iran’s	 military	 capabilities	 were	 declining,	 which	 constituted	 a	 material	
challenge.	Meanwhile,	the	Islamic	revolution	posed	an	ideational	challenge	through	its	appeal	to	
overthrow	regimes	oppressing	Islamist	movements.	Yet,	both	Syria	and	Saudi	Arabia	diverged	
on	what	constitutes	the	most	prominent	threat.	In	accordance	with	a	two‐layered	framework	of	
analysis,	 Saudi	 and	 Syrian	 cases	 demonstrate	 that	 perceptions	 of	 threat	 depend	 on	 the	
characteristics	of	the	regime	identity	and	the	policy	options	to	ensure	state’s	physical	security.	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 regimes	 consider	 ideational	 threats	 to	 be	 more	 prominent	 if	 the	 regime	
identity	 is	 fixed	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 military	 capabilities	 presents	 leaders	 with	 multiple	
policy	options.	The	perception	of	the	distribution	of	military	capabilities	becomes	subordinate	
to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 identity.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 regimes	 consider	 material	 threats	 as	 more	
prominent	if	the	regime	identity	is	fluid	and	leaders	have	the	ability	to	reframe	their	narratives	
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whereas	material	constraints	limit	their	policies	in	achieving	physical	security.		
The	article	highlights	the	characteristics	of	identity	as	a	function	that	should	be	carefully	
taken	 into	 account.	 Identity	 is	 by	 nature	 changeable;	 it	 is	 shaped	 and	 reshaped	 overtime	
through	 interactions	with	significant	Others.	Nevertheless,	 the	 interaction	with	 the	significant	
Other	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 only	 mean	 by	 which	 identity	 narratives	 are	 changing.	 Instead,	
Syria’s	case	shows	that	the	material	constraints	were	a	main	drive	behind	the	identity	change.	
The	cases	highlight	another	characteristic	of	identity,	that	is	fluidity.	This	characteristic	involves	
the	 extent	 to	which	 identities	 are	 fixed	 and	whether	 can	 political	 entrepreneurs	 change	 and	
create	identities	at	will.	Identity	serves	as	a	major	source	in	determining	foreign	policy,	yet	its	
function	is,	by	nature,	fluid.	A	state	has	multiple	identities,	each	of	which	may	persist,	evolve,	or	
cease	to	exist	over	time.	Given	such	versatile	aspect	of	identity,	this	study	cautions	against	the	
overly	deterministic	approach	that	treats	state	identity	as	if	it	is	the	permanent	property	of	state	
or	that	suggests	that	identity	is	constantly	the	sole	determinant	of	threat	perception	(Saideman	
2002,	186–188).	Although	a	fluid	identity	can	increase	leaders’	freedom	of	manoeuver,	this	does	
not	 mean,	 however,	 that	 identity	 fluidity	 gives	 leaders	 a	 free	 hand	 in	 manipulating	 identity	
narratives.	 Identities	 can	 also	 structure	 and	 constraints	 leaders’	 behaviour.	 The	 Saudi	 case	
shows	that	identity	narrative	can	be	a	strong	constraint	on	state	behavior.		
	 Given	 this	 adaptable	 and	 changeable	 nature	 of	 identity,	 there	 is	 little	 reason	 to	 limit	 the	
application	 of	 identity	 solely	 to	 long‐term	phenomena.	 This	 article	 does	 not	 claim	 that	 Saudi	
foreign	 policy	will	 be	 always	 driven	 by	 ideational	 factors	while	 Syrian	 foreign	 policy	will	 be	
eternally	driven	by	material	ones.	Instead,	states	can	switch	paths.	Saudi	Arabia	might	develop	
other	identities	that	provide	leaders	with	relative	freedom	of	manoeuvre	and	lessen	the	burden	
on	the	security	of	their	identity.	Similarly,	some	of	Syria’s	multiple	identities	can	cease	to	exist,	
putting	more	pressure	on	its	identity	security.		
	 	 Finally,	the	implications	of	this	article	extend	beyond	the	scope	of	Syrian	and	Saudi	threat	
perceptions	 to	 other	 cases	 of	 state’s	 threat	 perception	 in	 the	 region.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	
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framework	can	travel	across	space	by	applying	it	to	other	countries.	Potential	cases	may	include	
Jordan,	a	small	state	where	material	security	has	been	important,	but	where	ideational	factors	
have	also	been	significant	in	holding	together	various	domestic	groups.	Jordan	could	serve	as	a	
potential	 case	 for	 examining	 how	 the	 interaction	 between	 ideational	 and	 material	 interests.	
Another	interesting	case	to	examine	is	Egypt,	where	threat	perception	towards	Iran	constituted	
a	cornerstone	in	the	country’s	foreign	policy	for	decades.	Egypt	is	a	rather	homogenous	country	
with	no	Shiite	minority.	Nevertheless,	Iran,	a	geopolitically	distant	country,	was	identified	as	a	
threat.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 framework	 can	 travel	 across	 time	 to	 account	 for	 the	 recent	
dynamics	unfolding	 in	 the	Middle	East.	 It	 can	 enlighten	Syrian	 and	Saudi	divergence	 towards	
Hezbollah	 and	 Hamas	 during	 the	 2006	 Lebanon	 war	 and	 the	 2009	 Gaza	 war,	 respectively.	
Moreover,	the	framework	developed	here	may	shed	additional	light	on	recent	developments	in	
the	 region	 including	Saudi	 fears	 from	 the	establishment	of	 the	 Islamic	State	 in	 Iraq	and	Syria	
(ISIS).	 In	 sum,	 identity	and	material	 interests	equally	matter	 in	 regimes’	 threat	perception.	 In	
some	cases,	the	fluidity	of	identity	is	likely	to	mitigate	ideational	threats,	and	the	multiplicity	or	
the	 paucity	 of	 strategic	 options	 can	 profoundly	 affect	 the	 perception	 of	military	 threats.	 This	
article	thus	showed	that	threat	perception	is	not	only	a	mere	event	preceding	alliance	decisions,	
but	a	complex	phenomenon	at	the	intersection	of	material	capabilities	and	identity	politics,	at	
both	domestic	and	international	levels.	
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